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THE TORT CAUSE OF ACTIONt
Peter Ward*
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE'--
Thesis and Antithesis
Philip A. Landon in the fifteenth edition to Pollock, Torts, writes:
... The truth is, and we can face it with equanimity, that the law of
torts is just what Pollock declared that it could not be, a mere enumeration
of actionable injuries. The law is today, as it has always been, that only
that harm which falls within one of the specified categories of wrong doing
entitles the person aggrieved to a legal remedy. The categories of tort (not
of course, the categories of particular torts) are closed.'
W. T. S. Stallybrass in the tenth edition to Salmond, Torts, states the
proposition and Sir John's conclusion in this manner:
Does the law of torts consist of a fundamental general principle that
it is wrongful to cause harm to other persons in the absence of some specific
ground of justification or excuse, or does it consist of a number of specific
rules prohibiting certain kinds of harmful activity, and leaving all the
residue outside the sphere of legal responsibility? Sir John Sahnond took
the view that the second of these alternatives was that which had been
accepted by our law. "Just as the criminal law consists of a body of rules
establishing specific offenses, so" he said, "the law of torts consists of a
body of rules establishing specific injuries. Neither in the one case nor in
the other is there any general principle of liability. Whether I am prose-
cuted for an alleged offense, or sued for an alleged tort, it is for my
adversary to prove that the case falls within some specific and established
rule of liability, and not for me to defend myself by proving that it is
within some specific and established rule of justification or excuse."
For Sir John Salmond there was no English law of Tort; there was
merely an English law of Torts, that is, a list of acts and omissions which
in certain conditions, were actionable.2
Stallybrass, in criticizing this position of Salmond, then adds:
The safest conclusion seems to be that, although we have not yet dis-
covered any general principle of liability, the Courts, where they are not
fettered by any precedent, to-day have a bias towards holding that, where
one man has intentionally or carelessly caused damage to another, he shall
recompense him. In consequence, as the law develops we are moving in
the direction of a general principle of liability.3
The problem thus posed by Sir Frederick Pollock and Sir John Salmond
has not stirred up quite the same tempest on this side of the Atlantic.
I @ Copyright 1956 by Peter Ward.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead p. 74, for biographical data.
1 Pollock, Torts 45 (15th ed. 1951).
2 Salmond, Torts 15 (10th ed. 1945).
3 Id. at 17.
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The great majority of American tort writers faced with this problem-in
semantics throw up their hands with Professor Wigmore and join in
stating:
The first wish is that we might proscribe, expell, and banish the obnox-
ious term "Tort" as the title of the subject. Never did a Name so obstruct
a true understanding of the Thing. To such a plight has it brought us that
a favorite mode of defining a Tort is to declare merely that it is not a
contract. As if a man were to define Chemistry by pointing out that it is
not Physics nor Mathematics. No half-way measures will do; the name
must go.4
Jeremiah Smith in his classic article, "Tort and Absolute Liability-
Suggested Changes in Classification,"5 gives the interested reader page
after page of definitions, all, more or less, in the nirvana-like style of
Wigmore, whom he quotes.
Francis H. Bohlen, both as the Reporter for the Restatement of the
Law of Torts and through his own voluminous writings, has done much
to advance the theme of general principles in tort law. The Restate-
ment breaks down into classifications based on conduct of the actor-
intentional acts, negligent acts, and conduct entailing absolute liability.
Tortious conduct is defined in section 6 of the Restatement: "The word
'tortious' is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote
the fact that conduct whether of act or omission is of such a character as
to subject the actor to liability under the principles of the law of Torts."
Fowler Vincent Harper in the preface to his treatise on the Law of
Torts presents with nice simplicity the argument for common principles
when he writes: "The unitary character of the law, therefore, is not to
be looked for in the doctrinal development thereof, but in the broad no-
tions of policy from which these doctrines derive. It is this social, rather
than legalistic basis of tort law that affords the unifying principles."'
Dean William L. Prosser at the opening page of his second edition of
the Law of Torts attempts a hornbook synthesis of these variable con-
cepts in a polyglot definition:
1. "Tort" is a term applied to a miscellaneous and more or less uncon-
nected group of civil wrongs, other than breach of contract, for which a
court of law will afford a remedy in the form of an action for damages.
The law of torts is concerned with the compensation of losses suffered by
private individuals in their legally protected interests, through conduct of
others which is regarded as socially unreasonable.
The definitions are as numerous as the writers.7 The problem remains.
4 1 Wigmore, Torts viii (1911).
5 30 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 319, 409 (1916-17).
6 Harper, Torts v, vi (1933).
7 For additional analyses and comparisons of Tort casebooks, see Ward, "Selecting a Tort
Casebook or a Scenario entitled 'There were Seven'," 6 J. Legal Ed. 539 (1954).
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Is tort liability to be determined by categories or principles? This is
not simply a problem stirred up by academicians. The answer selected
by the law professor, the practitioner, and the jurist has an immediate
impact on the student, the preparation of the lawsuit, and the writing
of the opinion. Thereafter, as inexorably as the principles of causality,
the culture is affected, small and insignificant though the effects may be.
The purpose of this article is to pose the problem in this country in a
more specific manner than has been done; to point out some of the dif-
ficulties and inconsistancies that the "torts" theory forces upon the three
divisions of our profession and the public in general; to suggest that
certain common denominators exist in the various "torts," which can be
put together into what I call the Tort Cause of Action; to submit that
this Tort Cause of Action approach helps overcome many of the dif-
ficulties of the "torts" concept; to advance the proposition that those
principles common to tort liability are simply aspects of the same broad
principles in legal liability. Thesis and antithesis thus lead to synthesis.
Synthesis: The Tort Cause of Action: civil liability for damages legally
caused by violation of imposed duties.
Tort liability under the common-law system has from the very begin-
ning been determined on the basis of a posteriori arguments in contra-
distinction to the a priori logic of the civil law. Yet, the inductive process
of the common-law was undoubtedly less the result of design than of
necessity. In the early development of fear-damage, a hatchet blow in
the middle of the night before the startled eyes of Madam Tavern-Keeper
was reason enough for Judge Thorpe to sustain a verdict of half a marks
without needless concern for the principles which were being established
that would make the brandishing of a dunning letter worth $500.1
Peoples' claims had to be adjudicated on the facts as presented, not on
theories yet unborn. As the case became cases; as the volume of tort
litigation became identifiable and then unmanageable; as individual fact
situations came to resemble each other sufficiently to be molded together
under common principles of assault, of negligence, of induced breach of
contract, etc.; then a posteriori arguments generated a priori thinking.
My proposition is that the study of tort liability has attained sufficient
maturity to make the search for general principles worthwhile and that,
as discovered, they make the analysis of tort problems old and new more
meaningful. Seventy years later we can see more clearly what Sir
Frederick Pollock meant when, in 1886, he wrote: "It is not surprising in
8 1. de S. et ux v. W. de S., Y.B., Liber Assisarum, f99, pl. 60 (1349).
9 La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
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any case, that a complete theory of Torts is yet to seek, for the subject
is altogether modern. . . The really scientific treatment of principles
begins only with the discussion of the last fifty years."'0
II. SoE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE "TORTS" CONCEPT
The "Calf-Path," by Sam Walter Foss (1858-1911), neatly illustrates
the difficulties that precedent poses not only in case development but in
methodology.
THE CALF-PATH
One day through the primeval wood,
A calf walked home, as good calves should;
But made a trail all bent askew,
A crooked trail as all calves do.
The trail was taken up next day
By a lone dog that passed that way;
And then a wise bell-wether sheep
Pursued the trail o'er vale and steep,
And drew the flock behind him, too,
As good bell-wethers always do.
And from that day, o'er hill and glade,
Through those old woods a path was made;
And many men wound in and out,
And dodged, and turned and bent about
And uttered words of righteous wrath
Because 'twas such a crooked path.
But still they. followed-do not laugh-
The first migrations of that calf,
And through this winding wood-way stalked,
Because he wobbled when he walked.
The forest path became a lane,
That bent, and turned and turned again;
This crooked lane became a road,
Where many a poor horse with his load
Toiled on beneath the burning sun,
And traveled some three miles in one.
The years passed on in swiftness fleet,
The road became a village street;
And this, before men were aware,
A city's crowded thoroughfare,
And soon the central street was this
Of a renowned metropolis;
And men two centuries and a half
Trod in the footsteps of that calf.
I0 Pollock, Torts vii (1st ed. 1886).
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For thus such reverence is lent
To well-established precedent.
But how the wise old wood-gods laugh,
Who saw the first primeval calf!
As men wander down the crooked lane of "torts," words of righteous
wrath are sometimes uttered by those who teach the subject, those who
practice in the field, those who render judgment and those who suffer.
Pedagogical Difficulties
I start with the difficulties faced by the teacher of "torts" not because
of any supposed hierarchy of importance, but primarily because I am
writing as a teacher faced with these concrete problems. Not too long ago
the average number of hours allotted to the course in Torts was six per
week throughout the academic year. Today the average number is five.
At the Cornell Law School this means, because of the scheduling problems
of examinations and vacations, that the faculty man has 73 periods of
50 minutes each in which to handle the field. How broad is the field of
"torts"? Let me describe the coverage of the very excellent casebook
used in the course at Cornell." In addition to about 350 pages of mate-
rials, 415 principal cases are reported at varying length. Coverage
starts with Battery, Assault, Intentional Infliction of Mental Disturb-
ance, False Imprisonment, Trespass to Land, Trespass to Chattels and
Conversion, Privileges of Consent, Self-defense, Defense of Others, De-
fense of Property, Necessity, Recovery of Property and Re-entry upon
Real Property, Legal Authority, and Discipline. Then follows detailed
coverage in Negligence and Causation. Problems in the defense of As-
sumption of Risk, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and
"Last Clear Chance" are reported in detail. Some materials on Punitive
Damages, Measure of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, and the
peculiarities of Survival and Wrongful Death statutes are presented. The
cases move on to Strict Liability-Animals and Unusual or Ultrahazard-
ous Activities. Cases on Nuisance, Misrepresentation, and Defamation
abound. Liability toward Trespassing Children, Trespassing Adults, and
Business Invitees as well as liability between Lessors and Lessees, Ven-
dors and Vendees is carefully covered. Variations on the Buick case
come in for their fair share of cases. The book climaxes with Injurious
Falsehood, Right of Privacy, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process,
Interference with Contract, and Interference with Prospective Advantage
ending on page 1239. To complete the coverage of the casebook I have
11 Smith & Prosser, Cases & Materials on Torts (1952).
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found it necessary to give additional lectures on intentional and negligent
interferences with the family; tort aspects of respondeat superior; gov-
ernmental and charitable immunities; employers' liability under common-
law and under compensation statutes which include seamen. All this,
please remember, must be communicated in 73 periods to approximately
130 first year law students who, expecting to spend at least two weeks on
assault, find that just one period can be spared to "[i]f it were not
assize-time, I would not take such language from you."' 2 What happens
when the curriculum planners in their constant yet justifiable juggling
determine on a four hour course-or a course combining tort and contract
claims? There comes a point where the instructor no longer can talk
faster, when pure shame forbids him to rush heedlessly past the un-
answered questions, when the tyranny of the clock must be overthrown.
One answer, and that adopted by a rather large group of instructors, is to
cover only a part.13 But if, as Dean Prosser states in his hornbook, we
are dealing with ". . . a miscellaneous and more or less unconnected
group of civil wrongs, other than breach of contract .... "what help is it
to the student-turned-practitioner when his client is pressing him for a
telephone response to a multi-state libel situation, to recall that, due to
the pressure of time, he missed exposure to that subject in the Tort
Course he took. If the answer is "torts," can the teacher omit any of
the important compartments? Yet how can he possibly cover them all?
And, in covering them, can he ever be sure that he has them all? Part
of the answer lies in my oversimplification. No one is really a "torts"
purist. The pressures of coverage, of probing questions, of student case
assignments-all these difficulties force certain generalizations in peda-
gogical approaches from Bohlen's:
(1) intent
(2) negligence
(3) strict liability
to Wigmore's tertiary order and division of:
(1) damage element
(2) responsibility element
(3) excuse or justification element 14
to Jeremiah Smith's classification based on:
(1) breach of genuine contract
(2) tort, in the sense of fault
(3) so-called "absolute liability" imposed by courts, where there is neither
breach of genuine contract nor fault.15
12 Tuberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. 3 (1669).
13 Smith & Prosser, op. cit. supra at ix where the editors state "It is an open secret that
few teachers of Torts ever really succeed in covering even the major part of any casebook."
14 Wigmore, "The Tripartite Division of Torts," 8 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1894).
15 Supra note S.
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The concept of liability based on fault waxed and, under the pens of
Cardozo and Seavey, broadened into "the risk reasonably to be per-
ceived defines the duty to be obeyed ... ,, 3 Albert A. Ehrenzweig saw
a common principle of risk, but one involving, not foreseeability of risk,
but rather typicality of risk.' 7 The latest, and what appears to me to be
one of the better efforts to solve the difficult problem of teaching tort
liability, is presented, as one might well expect, by Leon Green. 8
While basic principles involving conduct of the actor, interests violated,
risks foreseeable or typical, help the teacher through some of the difficult
problems of coverage inherent in the concept of "torts," inconsistancies
plague the disciple of Salmond or Landon. Is nuisance one of the so-
called torts, or does it simply typify a kind of damage-an injury to a
particular interest brought about in one of several possible ways? What
are the boundaries of misrepresentation? Where the plaintiff's damage
is brought about through the defendant's misrepresentation, is the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence sometimes to be treated one way and some-
times another? Defamation-is it one tort or three?
The struggle the teacher and his students have on these points results
from the problem of torts. Shall we label the publisher's liability for
the intentionally conceived utterance, Defamation 1; his liability for
carelessness, Defamation 2; his non-fault liability, Defamation 3? But
if this is one rather than three torts what word shall we use? At this
point in a class discussion I generally ask my students if there is any
among them that can, in English, write the sentence "There are three. 2's
in the English language," meaning not three 2's but one word which will
encompass the words two, to, and too. Someone always volunteers and
thus very concretely poses the problem of "torts" in those situations
whereby the damage may be brought about by conduct variously
motivated.
The standard technique for developing the student's legal thinking
during his first term in law school is not unlike the Topsy-like growth of
the first six centuries of common-law. Piece after piece of disconnected
material is stuffed into his cranium. The hope is that the student may
16 Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928); Seavey,
"Negligence, Subjective or Objective," 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1927); Seavey, "Cardozo and
the Law of Torts," 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372 (1938); Prosser, "Palsgraf Revisited," 52 Mich. L.
Rev. 1 (1953).
17 Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951). Leading articles on the fault contro-
versy include Baker, "An Eclipse of Fault Liability," 40 Va. L. Rev. 273 (1954); Griffith,
"Fault Triumphant," 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1069 (1953); Leflar, "Negligence in Name Only," 27
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 564 (1952).
18 Green, "The Study and Teaching of Tort Law," 34 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1955).
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glimpse a kind of pattern by Christmas, perhaps by the end of the term,
surely by Easter recess. Necessity may well have required such a devel-
opment by the early common-law judge, but the benefit of hindsight
should permit us to offer a less confusing approach to the neophyte.
Problems of the Practitioner
The busy practitioner is not apt to become unduly agitated by either
the polymorphic or monomorphic argument. His problems are not only
different in degree, but in kind from those of the teacher. 19 He is fond
of being practical. How many can even find, let alone utilize, those once-
prized class notes wherein every symbol had a meaning, every underlin-
ing a special emphasis ?
This Jifference between the teacher and the practitioner stems from the
basic facts of practice and does much to affect his legal philosophy. The
pressures upon a busy lawyer are far more severe and nerve-wracking
than those under which a teacher operates. While the work load may be
relative, this tension is not. The time he can set aside for academic
theories, therefore, may be strictly limited. Probably, if he has adequate
time for theorizing, it is because he has more time than clientsl
Whether it is due to forces such as these or untold others, the effect
seems to be that if you ask the lawyer what is the most important single
question in a lawsuit, he will ask, "how much damage has the plaintiff
suffered?" Instinctively, the lawyer practicing in the tort field, whether
representing the plaintiff or the defendant, thinks of tort liability in the
terms of his particular lawsuit rather than in general principles. His
arguments are a posteriori rather than a priori. He is a ready-made
disciple for Sir John Salmond. Nevertheless, he, too, both affects and is
effected by the conceptual argument.
The lawyer is basically a fact-finder. Of course, that is a title generally
reserved for a jury. But juries only get the facts as they are presented
by counsel. What facts are important to his lawsuits? What facts are
relevant? What divides facts from theories? Is a fact anything more
than a point of view? An engineer in a defense plant engaged in the
manufacture of tools and implements for the United States Government
was allegedly charged by the plant president, within the hearing of plant
employees, with being a communist. Is this actionable slander? Judge
Martin M. Frank, sitting in Special Term, New York County, held the
complaint stated a cause of action ° The New York Court of Appeals
19 The author's background includes some twelve years of practice, ten of which were
spent as a partner in a firm in general practice in Buffalo, N.Y.
20 Gurtler v. Union Parts Mfg. Co., 206 Misc. 801, 135 N.YS.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1954).
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said, "No."'" Was it an important fact that plaintiff was a chief engineer?
That defendant was a defense plant? That this was 1954, not 1944?
Will not the lawyer's finding of facts be influenced by Pollock vs. Sal-
mond? For the routine lawsuit, which makes up the bulk of the practice,
the plural concept works out with few problems: the automobile im-
properly turning right on the red signal, the unprovoked fight in a saloon,
the garage man who unjustifiably refuses to return your automobile, the
false charge of embezzlement published to others without privilege, etc.
These situations can easily be answered by referring to the appropriate
Restatement of Torts sections, or any adequate hornbook, or a dozen
controlling decisions. Here "torts" presents no difficulties.
When the lawyer isn't fact-finding he is predicting. A tremendous
amount of time is spent in advising well-trained clients on ways in which
to avoid damage liability. How successful his advice will be, assuming it
is followed, depends on his ability to predict what the ultimate judge
or judges in his case will decide. Here again the routine situation re-
sponds well to the "torts" concept of compartments wherein we can
reach for our answer. The exception merely proves the rule.22
"Torts" has its difficulties for the practitioner in the unusual, the un-
charted, the bizarre. When Arthur Wagner and his cousin Herbert
boarded the interurban railway car between Buffalo and Niagara Falls,
little did they realize the litigation that lay ahead, or the difficulties that
Arthur's counsel would have in trying to stretch the sides of the negli-
gence compartment so as to make room for the danger-invited rescuer.23
Or consider the case of Mr. Belt, an advertising man, who brought an
action against the Hamilton National Bank for the wrongful appropria-
tion of an idea for creating a radio program, the participants in which
were to be school children who had vocal or instrumental talent. The
bank allegedly used this idea, after its disclosure to the bank by Mr. Belt,
without making compensation therefor. Plaintiff's counsel had no ready-
made tort compartment available which would give effect to a property
right in an idea, which idea was neither patentable nor subject to copy-
right. There was no specified category of wrongdoing entitling Mr. Belt
21 Gurtler v. Union Parts Mfg. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 5, 132 N.E.2d 889 (1956), affirming 285
App. Div. 643, 140 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1st Dep't 1955).
22 The author recalls his strongly urged advice in the case of Nicholas v. New York State
Elec. and Gas Corp., 308 N.Y. 930, 127 N.E.2d 84 (1955). His partner had obtained a
$40,000 verdict for the plaintiff which had been appealed. The Appellate Division, 4th
Dep't, reversed and dismissed the complaint by a vote of 3-2. At the author's urging, the
case (with a very expensive record) was taken to the Court of Appeals which by a vote of
4-3 affirmed the dismissal.
23 Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
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to a legal remedy. Fortunately for Mr. Belt, Judge.Holtzoff, in denying
a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, was able to agree with
plaintiff's counsel and write:
The principal question presented is whether there is a property right
in an idea and, if so, to what extent. Originally at common law such a
property right did not exist. This circumstance, however, is not determi-
native of the matter. Qne of the basic characteristics of the common law
is that it is not static, but is endowed with vitality and capacity to grow.
It never becomes permanently crystallized but changes and adjusts itself
from time to time to new developments in social and economic life in order
to meet the changing needs of society-)9
Other problems of "torts" occasionally plague the practitioner as he
presents his facts to the court. Are the facts all right and the theory all
wrong? Has he made the mistake of applying for relief in the United
States Court of Claims when it is later decided that he should have been
in the District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act-too late,
perhaps? Will the judgment on his verdict be reversed because, in an
action for deceit, the verdict was based on the wrong measure of
damage although the Supreme Court of California was divided as to
what was the proper measure anyway?"5
The lawyer practicing in this field has worries that involve torts or
tort liability, but then he is a professional worrier. Torts solve the routine
problems. On balance he probably won't get excited about the Tort Cause
of Action or any other theory except the one he needs for his particular
lawsuit or client. A posteriori concepts work with him. It is not re-
markable that the problems of the teacher and the practitioner differ, nor
that their solutions are not always the same. Different responsibilities
create different problems and solutions.
Juridical Difficulties
No apology is required by me, as a lawyer discussing the problems of
the practitioner, or as a professor presenting pedagogical difficulties of
the teacher. In suggesting some of the perplexities forced on the judge
by the "torts" concept, refuge from the charge of pedantry is sought in
the words of Benjamin Cardozo. Pleading for a Ministry of Justice to
mediate between the legislature and the courts, his words seem ap-
propriate to the law teacher looking at the courts.
For there are times when deliverance, if we are to have it-at least, if
we are to have it with reasonable speed-must come to us, not from within,
but from without. Those who know best the nature of the judicial process,
v24 Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689, 690 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd, 210 F.2d
706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
25 Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
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know best how easy it is to arrive at an impasse. Some judge, a century
or more ago, struck out upon a path. The course seemed to be directed
by logic and analogy. No milestone of public policy or justice gave warning
at the moment that the course was wrong, or that danger lay ahead. Logic
and analogy beckoned another judge still farther. Even yet there was no
hint of opposing or deflecting forces. Perhaps the forces were not in being.
At all events, they were not felt. The path went deeper and deeper into the
forest. Gradually there were rumblings and stirrings of hesitation and dis-
trust, anxious glances were directed to the right and to the left, but the
starting point was far behind, and there was no other path in sight.2 6
As with the practitioner, the routine case seldom presents to the jurist
the dilemma of "torts." But in the hands of a zealous practitioner, how
many routine cases appear in the advance sheets?
Arvid Oksa took out a $5,000/$10,000 motor vehicle liability policy in
April, 1951, which enabled him to comply with the New York Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act then in force. Effective July 1, 1951,
the Act was amended to require minimum coverage of $10,000/$20,000.
In August, 1951, the plaintiff's automobile was involved in an accident.
Thereafter Mr. Oksa's license to operate a motor vehicle was suspended
because his liability policy did not meet the financial responsibility re-
quirements of the 1951 amendment. Mr. Oksa sued the insurance com-
pany for damages because it had not increased the limits of liability of the
policy to satisfy the new requirements. The complaint contained four
counts-alleged respectively in terms of contract, custom, negligence, and
conspiracy to defraud. The district judge dismissed. On appeal in a
per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in affirm-
ing stated: "The appeal is utterly futile. How the appellant could have
hoped to succeed is beyond comprehension. ' ' 27 Yet, is it "beyond com-
prehension" if one thinks in terms of general principles rather than com-
partments? The pendular swing of court decisions on the effect of delay
by insurance companies in acting on applications might be somewhat
analogous.2 8 Appeals there have not always been futile.
Cases involving damage to land, chattels, and easements constantly
perplex the judge with the difficulties of "torts." The Socony-Vacuum
Company was the owner of an easement to maintain and operate a pipe
line across certain rural property in Cattaraugus County, New York,
owned at the time by the Vacuum Gas Burner Company. The defendant,
pursuant to a contract with the Vacuum Gas Burner Company to level
the latter's property, operated a bulldozer in such a manner that he ran
26 Cardozo, "A Ministry of justice," 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 115 (1921).
2T Oksa v. Am. Employer's Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1955).
28 For a detailed analysis of this problem of delay see Prosser, "Delay in Acting on an
Application for Insurance," 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 39 (1935).
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into and broke the plaintiff's buried line. The instrument creating the
easement was duly recorded, but there is no proof that the defendant had
actual knowledge of the location or even the existence of the line. There
was no evidence of negligence on the defendant's part in striking the
pipe line. Judge Hamilton Ward granted the defendant's motion for a
non-suit and dismissal of the complaint2 9 In his opinion, Judge Ward
struggles with the problem of "torts":
From an analysis of the pleadings and briefs, it appears that the plain-
tiff seeks to recover on the theory that the defendant committed a trespass
to its easement and to its pipe line. If this court understands correctly the
substance of the plaintiff's position, it attempts to claim an actionable
wrong by the defendant against its easement of a type which might have
been covered at common law by an action of trespass on the case and
further, a wrong against its personalty, i.e., the pipe line, as a trespass to
chattels, which might have been founded at common law on the ancient
actions of trespass vi et armis or de bonis asportatis. It does not seek to
recover on the theory of a trespass quare clausum fregit to its easement.
Because of the requirement that trespass quare clausum fregit must be
against a possessory estate in real property, it was well established at com-
mon law that an easement, being an incorporeal hereditament was not such
an interest as would support that action (citations omitted). . . . It is
important to analyze the act which constitutes the alleged trespass before
it can be found to be actionable under the principles underlying any of the
common law actions of trespass.30
Finding neither negligence nor intent, the court dismissed the complaint.
Problems in limitation of time for the commencement of actions whip-
saw their way through the compartmentalized theory of "torts." When,
in 1953, Mr. Swankowski brought an action against his doctor for al-
legedly permitting a surgical needle to remain in his abdomen, the fact
that Mr. Swankowski learned of this nearly three years before com-
mencing his action was to cause him nearly as much pain as the needle.
Judge Conn of the Ohio Court of Appeals31 gave him the orthodox
answer that, if anything, this act fitted into the compartment of "mal-
practice," which was barred by the one year statute of limitations,
rather than the "deceit" tort, to which a four year statute of limitations
was applicable.
In New York a plaintiff's counsel was more successful in persuading the
court to apply the period of limitation designated in the complaint by
counsel. Plaintiff's employee, acting without authority, delivered a quan-
29 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Bailey, 202 Misc. 364, 109 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1952), 37 Cornell L.Q. 804 (1952). The New York Court of Appeals has recently
struggled with the problem of intent and negligence in trespass cases. Phillips v. Sun Oil
Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954), 40 Cornell L.Q. 387 (1955).
30 202 Misc. at 365-66.
31 Swanskowski v. Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 129 N.E.2d 182 (1953).
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tity of wax to the defendant. More than three years after defendant's
refusal to return it, plaintiff sued in quasi-contract for the value of the
wax. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it was barred by the three year statute covering actions to recover
damages for an injury to property. By carefully framing his complaint
as an action for restitution rather than in tort, he persuaded the court
that the six year rather than the three year label governed.2
This poses a further difficulty inherent in "torts." How to distinguish
between compartments in torts, compartments in contracts, and compart-
ments in sales? How to differentiate between false imprisonment in an
action at common law and an action in admiralty? 33 In an action by a
patient against a hospital for the furnishing of impure blood in a blood
transfusion for a stated sum, the New York Court of Appeals held the
act was primarily a hospital service and not within the Sales Act, so as
to permit the patient to recover on the theory of a breach of warranty. 4
The plaintiff, a seaman, sued in Admiralty under the Jones Act for
injuries allegedly resulting from the defendant's negligence and for un-
paid expenses for maintenance and cure. Upon his death prior to trial,
the district judge dismissed the negligence action, but permitted recovery
for maintenance and cure on the theory of non-abatement of contract
actions.', Judge Rifkind writes with refreshing candor in the District
Court:
The second question is whether the claim for maintenance and cure
abated on Sperbeck's death. No answer to this question has been provided
by the authorities. Counsel informs me that diligent search has not dis-
covered a case directly in point. The argument has therefore taken a turn
toward the classification of the claim for maintenance and cure as con-
tractual, delictual or belonging to an independent category. Of that, too,
there is no clearcut determination. When the legal materials are as plastic
as they are on this question the forms of logical deduction are illusory since
the desired conclusion is surreptitiously introduced into the premises. It
may as well, therefore, be done candidly. Preferring to hold that the claim
for maintenance and cure does not abate at the death of the seaman entitled
thereto, I chose to classify the claim pro hac vice as contractual3 6
Judge Frank, writing the opinion for the affirming court of appeals,
seems to completely overlook this demonstration of "hunch" jurispru-
32 Dentists' Supply Co. v. Cornelius, 281 App. Div. 306, 119 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't
1953), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 624, 116 N.E.2d 238 (1953). As to the effect of this decision
upon the "gravamen" theory in New York, see 39 Cornell L.Q. 755 (1954).
33 Forgioni v. United States, 202 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1953).
34 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954), 40 Cornell
L.Q. 803 (1955).
35 Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 88 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d
449 (2d Cir. 1951), 25 So. Calif. L. Rev. 343 (1952).
36 Id. at 625.
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dence which once so interested him, and he subconsciously plays out the
game he facetiously wrote about under the formula R X F = D (Rules
times Facts equals Decision)."
But how the wise old wood-gods laugh,
Who saw the first primeval calf!
Impact on the Layman
In an action for a declaratory judgment on a fire insurance policy,
Judge Cuthbert Pound, in reaffirming the personal nature of the contract,
disposes of plaintiff's arguments thus: "These reasons may savor of
layman's ideas of equity, but they are not law. ' 38 Taking this quotation
out of context undoubtedly does a disservice to the memory of Judge
Pound, a liberal judge, 9 yet it illustrates a distinction between positive
law and living law that many laymen conceive of as existing in the minds
of the legal professionals.
Picture the interdepartmental consternation in the Argonne Company40
an employer of harbor workers and longshoremen. It was paying sub-
stantial insurance premiums required by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.4 Presumably the employer was familiar
with section 5 of the Act which provides that the liability of the employer
for compensation for injuries sustained by the employees in the course
of the employment "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee, his legal representatives, husband or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account
of such injury .... "" After paying the "exclusive" compensation as
provided by the act to its injured employee, additional damage liability
was assessed under a compartment of "torts" hitherto undiscerned-a
wife's action for loss of consortium because of injuries negligently in-
flicted on her husband.
Or consider the appreciative remarks that must have been muttered
by the employing Rothschild International Stevedoring Company.43 One
of its employees was killed aboard ship. The widow sued the shipowner
37 Frank, "What Courts Do In Fact," 26 Ill. L. Rev. 645 (1932).
38 Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 374, 146 N.E. 630, 632 (1925).
39 See Edgerton, "A Liberal Judge: Cuthbert W. Pound," 21 Cornell L.Q. 7 (1935).
40 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950),
36 Cornell L.Q. 148 (1950).
41 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1952).
42 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1952).
43 States S.S. Co. v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 205 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1953),
67 Harv. L. Rev. 884 (1954). See also Weinstock, "The Employer's Duty to Indemnify
Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Workers," 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 321 (1954).
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under its non-delegable duty to provide longshoremen with a safe place
to work. This suit being settled, the shipowner recovered its loss, by way
of indemnity, from the employing stevedore company, notwithstanding
the so-called exclusive section 5.
Every difficulty that "torts" poses to the jurist and the practitioner is
magnified for the public. Obviously, the necessary technicalities of the
law are apt to escape the understanding of the lay public. However, it
would seem reasonable for the legal professionals to assume the respon-
sibility for reducing to a minimum this sense of "apartness." Positive law
does not anchor itself in the living law when it declares that a tort
labelled "intentional interference with contractual rights" requires as a
sine qua non to the tort some sort of a contract4 4 and then adds that if
this contract which is being interfered with is a land contract, the very
fact that a valid contract exists will defeat the plaintiff who sues in New
York for the tort of "slander of title."45 Similarly is the layman puzzled
by the professionals' attempted distinctions between nonfeasance and
misfeasance, between legal duties and moral duties. It is not suggested
that a concept of general principles of tort liability will provide a legal
"do-it-yourself" kit for the layman. It is suggested that a plural torts
concept raises for the public as many difficulties as it solves.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TORT CAUSE OF ACTION
If the idea of "torts" as "a mere enumeration of actionable injuries"46
raises as many problems as it appears to solve for the teacher, the practi-
tioner, the jurist, and the public, can an improved methodology be evolved
which avoids this weakness? I suggest that such an improvement is per-
fectly feasible. As pointed out in Part I, many legal writers have pre-
ferred to describe tort liability in terms of exclusion rather than inclu-
sion. When classification is based on conduct of the defendant, by defini-
tion, cases identifiable with the intentional infliction of harm exclude those
cases based on negligent conduct and those cases wherein liability is
thrust on a non-fault basis. In cataloguing tort liability in accordance
with the particular interest of the plaintiff that has been violated, by
definition, a grouping of land-interest cases exclude cases involving
damage to reputation. An arrangement based on similar fact situations
has perhaps the most exclusions of all. Combination of these and other
sorting systems only reduces the degree of exclusion. The deterrent to a
unitary inclusive process of analysis is really the same deterrent that
44 Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
45 Felt v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 149 App. Div. 14, 133 N.Y. Supp. 519 (1st Dep't 1912).
46 See note 1 supra.
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forced the early common law to a plural exclusive theory of "torts." That
is-how to describe a compartment elastic enough to hold all the so-
called "torts" thus far labelled and those yet to be catalogued? It is
like the problem faced by the modern physicists. How to design a con-
tainer to hold a fire hot enough to consume all known substances? The
solution the physicist offers is a radical one-substitute electro-magnetic
forces for top, sides, and bottom. The solution to the legal problem may
be equally radical-conform the tort compartment to the lowest common
denominators present in the various "torts." I suggest that such common
denominators do exist and can be identified.
Dean Prosser defines the traditional elements of the negligence cause of
action as follows:
The elements necessary to a cause of action based on negligence are:
a. A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct for the protection
of others against unreasonable risks.
b. A failure to conform to the standard.
c. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury.
d. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
47
Not included in the definition are words describing a cause of action
itself. In discussing the meaning of that term, Mr. Justice Cardozo stated:
A "cause of action" may mean one thing for one purpose and something
different for another. It may mean one thing when the question is whether
it is good upon demurrer, and something different when there is a question
of the amendment of a pleading or of the application of the principle of
res judicata (citations omitted). At times and in certain contexts, it is
identified with the infringement of a right or the violation of a duty. At
other times and in other contexts, it is a concept of the law of remedies,
the identity of the cause being then dependent on that of the form of action
or the writ. Another aspect reveals it as something separate from writs
and remedies, the group of operative facts out of which a grievance has
developed. This court has not committed itself to the view that the phrase
is susceptible of any single definition that will be independent of the context
or of the relation to be governed.48
Judge Learned Hand later added:
Courts have vacillated in defining a "cause of action," some taking the
view that it is the nexus of all those facts that must be proved to enable
the plaintiff to recover; others, that it is only the interest-or "right"--for
whose invasion the plaintiff seeks redress.49
Demonstrating the kinship of substantive and adjective law, the mixing
of common-law and code pleading, I entitle this process of analysis The
47 Prosser, Torts 165 (2d ed. 1955).
48 United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67 (1932).
49 Burns Bros. v. The Central R.R., 202 F.2d 910, 911 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Tort Cause of Action. From the law of negligence, I have taken the
four terms which are familiar to all legal professionals: duty, violation,
cause, and damage. My proposition is that these common denominators
may be discerned in varying degrees in all the so-called "torts." I
propose to examine each of these four terms, but in a different order than
that just stated.
Damages
The dollar problem of "torts" is not whether actual damages are re-
quired, but rather in what cases will they be presumed, and when must
they be alleged and proved. Certainly a common denominator to all
actionable injuries is the factor of injuria. The Restatement of Torts
oversimplifies the question of damages in discussing trespass to land
by stating:
One who intentionally enters land in the possession of another without the
consent of the possessor or other privilege so to do, is liable for a trespass
under the rule stated in section 158, although his presence on the land
causes no harm to the land, its possessor or to anything or person in whose
security the possessor has a legally protected interest. 50
It would perhaps be more accurate to point out that proof of this
particular damnum raises a presumption of injuria.
Plaintiff Dixon brought an action in trespass quare clausum fregit
against Clow. At the trial Dixon asked the court to charge that the "jury
had a right to presume damages from the acts proved. But the court
refused so to charge; and instructed the jury, that they doubted much
whether the jury could find a verdict for the plaintiff, when he not only
had not proved any sum as damages in 'consequence of the defendant's
acts, but after being enquired of by the court whether he intended to
prove the amount of his damages, his counsel answered that he did not
intend to offer any proof of the amount of damages."51 On appeal, this
refusal to charge was held to be improper in that the plaintiff was entitled
to a verdict for nominal damages at the least.52
Similarly, in the action of trespass vi et armis, the least unpermitted
touching of another is a sufficient damnum to presume injuria and permit
the recovery of nominal damages at the least. 3
50 Restatement, Torts § 163 (1934).
51 Dixon v. Clow, 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 188, 189 (1840).
52 The matter of nominal damages presents a hard problem for the practitioner dealing
with statutory costs. He may get a verdict for nominal damages, yet have a judgment for
costs assessed against him. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1472, 1475.
53 Dean Prosser at p. 31 of his Law of Torts (1955) defines the contact required in
battery as any unpermitted or unprivileged contact. On the other hand Restatement, Torts
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In actions of trespass to chattels, de bonis asportatis, again the problem
of actual damages is a problem of adjective rather than substantive law.
Will damages be presumed on the analogy to trespass quare clausum
fregit, or is the interest in personalty sufficiently subordinate to that in
realty so as to require proof of damages?54
Throughout the entire field of negligence damages are essential and
are to be proved rather than presumed. The difficult problem of
damages in the field of defamation is not whether they must exist, but
whether they will be presumed, as in the actionable per se situations, or
whether they must be specifically pleaded and proved. So on through
misrepresentation, disparagement, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
and finally the prima facie tort; it remains a problem of proof rather than
of the cause of action itself. Judge Cardozo in the Palsgraf case wrote:
"One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by
showing without more that there has been damage to his person." 55
Some of the more recent writers might disagree as to the future of damage
liability,56 but perhaps it is not expecting too much to suggest that al-
though damages alone may not be enough, whether presumed or proved,
they are a sine qua non to civil liability and a denominator common to
all "torts." The judicial recognition of peculiar damage as differentiated
from the measurement of damages, i.e., the prenatal injury cases, is not
properly a part of the denominator damages. Depending on one's frame
of reference, damnum is either a cause or a duty problem.57
§ 13 (1934) speaks of harmful or offensive contacts. Which definition is accepted might
mean the difference between liability or non-liability in a case like Vosburg v. Putney, 80
Wis. 523, go N.W. 403 (1891), involving a playful but unpermitted tap on the shin given
by one school boy to another while class was in session.
54 The older text writers say no proof of actual damages is required: Salmond, Torts 318
(10th ed. 1945); Pollock, Torts 277 (14th ed. 1939); cf., 15th ed. (1951) at p. 264. The
Restatement, Torts § 218, comment f and the more recent writers indicate proof of
actual damages is required: Harper, Torts 53-54 (1933); Prosser, Torts 65 (2d ed. 1955).
The case authority for either proposition is very limited.
55 248 N.Y. at 345, 162 N.E. at 101.
56 See W. G. Friedman, "Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability," 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 241 (1949).
57 Judge Pilcher, in J. D'Almeida Aranjo Lda. v. Sir F. Becker & Co., [1953] 2 Q.B.
329, 335, 2 All E.R. 288, 291, cites the following passage from Cheshire, Private Inter-
national Law 659 (4th ed. 1952):
" ...remoteness of liability or remoteness of damage must be distinguished from
measure of damages. The rules relating to remoteness indicate what kind of a loss
actually resulting from the commission of a tort or from a breach of contract is
actionable; the rules for the measure of damages show the method by which com-
pensation for an actionable loss is calculated. Damage may be, but damages can
never be, too remote .... .
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Cause
What a slippery word! 58 Efforts to master it recall the words of T. S.
Eliot in East Coker.
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it....
The jurisprudens, the scientist, the lawyer, the teacher, the witness, the
judge, and the jury all struggle with the term. And struggle they must,
for certainly here, somehow, someway, we are dealing with a basic
determinant of tort liability. No matter what label the category of
wrong-doing bears, somehow we must connect the defendant to the plain-
tiff's damages, be it by chains or gossamer threads.
The difficulty lies in the degrees of causation. Drop a stone into a
pond. As the stone strikes the surface of the water, concentric ripples
race outward, ever diminishing. How far out can we pursue the ripples
of causation and still identify a denominator common throughout tort
liability? Connecting the stone-thrower to the damage caused by wave
motion of the remote water particles technically may be one connected
series of events for the jurisprudens or the scientist, but grosser calipers
measure cause in fact and remote consequences. The cause in fact of
the wave motion was the stone striking the surface of the water. With-
out the stone, there would have been no ripples. Nevertheless, liability
for damages caused by remote ripples may or may not be thrust on the
stone-thrower. He will be excluded from tort liability unless he can be
connected with the events surrounding the throwing of the stone. In
the logomachy of causation, it is this cause in fact that I have selected as
another common factor throughout "torts." This limited theory of causa-
tion is not without difficulties. What is the cause, as thus defined, of
P's death after receiving from X and Y simultaneously, two head wounds,
either of which independently is capable of killing him? Superficially,
cause in fact flounders. As a practical answer there is no problem; X
and Y are both causes in .fact. The lawyer's function (and the estab-
lishment of cause in fact is primarily a matter for the practitioner) is to
58 Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1920); Bing-
ham, "Legal Cause at Common Law," 9 Colum. L. Rev. 16, 136 (1909); Bohlen, "The
Probable or Natural Consequence Test," 49 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 79 (1910); Edgerton,
"Legal Cause," 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 211, 243 (1923); James and Perry, "Legal Cause," 60
Yale L.. 761 (1951); McLaughlin, "Proximate Cause," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1925); Smith,
"Legal Causes in Actions of Tort," 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 223, 303 (1911) ; Green, Rationale,
Approximate Cause (1927) ; Foss, The Calf Path (1896).
[Vol. 42
TORT CAUSE OF ACTION
discover and present those facts which connect the defendant's act to the
plaintiff's damage-to establish that the metal in the patented scaffold-
ing was bent while cold, thus setting up an internal strain, subsequently
shattering the metal under a slight impact, and catapulting the plaintiff
to the ground. In thus limiting cause to a factual investigation and
excluding the policy considerations of remote consequences, cause can
be traced as a substantive requirement in all the various "torts." The
defense of contributory negligence may involve analysis under cause only
if the degree of contributory fault is sufficient to be a cause in fact.
Otherwise, it would be treated as a policy matter under another de-
nominator-Duty. What, though, is sufficient to be a cause in fact? Here
is where the degrees of causation make difficult the gross division of
causation into factual cause and liability for remote consequences. In
the vast majority of situations the division is workable. In the bizarre
cases, cause in fact can only be pinned down by policy consideration.
Jeremiah Smith suggested that an event was a cause if it was a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the damages.5 9 Actually, this is a policy
consideration. As a result of this shadow-land between cause in fact and
cause in policy, the bizarre case makes one judge, Andrews, say that
Helen Palsgraf's problem is one of causation; the other, Cardozo, that
the anterior question is one of duty. Yet the principle of cause in fact
does exist throughout the field of tort liability. Policy discussions of
proximate and legal causation, of remote consequences, creep in unavoid-
ably as the analysis begins to shift from the denominator cause to the
denominator duty.
Duty
The selection of the principles damages and cause will perhaps arouse
only mild criticism. Terming the policy denominator duty will be con-
sidered more than contributory negligence on my part; it is assumption
of the risk! Felix S. Cohen had a description for "peculiar concepts
which are not defined either in terms of empirical fact or in terms of
ethics"-"transcendental nonsense"!60 He points out, "Legal arguments
couched in these terms are necesgarily circular, since these terms are
themselves creations of law, and such arguments add precisely as much
to our knowledge as Moliere's physician's discovery that opium puts men
-to sleep because it contains a dormative principle."6' Dean Prosser
agrees that attempted solutions based on duty "are shifting sands, and no
59 Smith, supra note 58, at 309.
60 Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," 35 Colum. L. Rev.
809 (1935).
61 Cohen, supra note 60, at 820.
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fit foundation .... There is a duty if the court says there is a duty;
the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word
with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability;
it necessarily begs the essential question.... That is merely a dog chasing
its own tail."62
Agreed. That very drawback of the word is its principal virtue in
solving the semantic difficulty inherent in settling on a term which will
communicate with a degree of reasonable probability, that bundle of
juridical reflexes, from hunch to stare decisis, discernible throughout
"torts" that determine the liability for the immediate and the remote con-
sequences of human relationships. Duty, in the sense I use it, is thus
correlative not with "right" but with "interest." The nexus here is the
judge. Whether the "tort" is slander or assault, negligence or ultra-
hazardous activity, false arrest or false imprisonment, the interests of
one must be weighed against those of another or others on scales of
absolute or relative values. This weighing process is considered by some
in terms of proximate or legal causation.63 Others weigh in terms of duty,
generally as limited to a particular tort or torts.64 In either process, the
factors used are about the same-gravity of harm, social utility of con-
duct, ease of damage prevention, administrative difficulties, prophylactic
effects, time and space factors, sense of "rightness" or "wrongness,"
foreseeability, typicality, spreading the risk, impact of insurance, princi-
ples of order, state of mind of actor, state of prejudice of counsel, court,
and jury.
While a student at Cornell, Hamilton Whited Budge, now practicing
in California, was discussing with me this curious legal phenomenon.
His suggestion as to why some instinctively analyze in terms of duty,
and others in terms of proximate causation has proved unforgettable.
As Budge put it, the relativist is forced to think in terms of duty; the
absolutist (that is, in the terms of human rights) in terms of proximate
cause. Regardless of the nature and type of damage, the relativist
recognizes no absolute duty in the first instance to avoid damage. To
the human rights absolutist, on the other hand, certain kinds of damage
self-evidently thrust a duty of responsibility, unless the policy considera-
tions of causation insulate.
62 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 16.
63 Supra note 57.
64 Bohlen, "Owners Duty to those Rightfully in Possession," 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237,
340 (1920); Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," 28 Colum. L. Rev. 1014
(1928), 29 Colum. L. Rev. 255 (1929); James, "Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases," 47
Nw. U. L. Rev. 778 (1953); Winfield, "Duty in Tortious Negligence," 34 Colum. L. Rev.
41 (1934).
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In theory, it might make no difference if the separate roads traveled
by the relativist and the absolutist arrived at the same determination
of the case. In practice, however, it may make a great deal of difference
whether the policy question is solved on a duty or a cause basis. When
the solution is sought in the terminology of duty, no one questions but
that the determination is to be made by the judge, who, in theory if not
in fact, is better trained for the job than the jury. If, however, the
solution is sought in the terminology of causation, and the court fails to
separate the problems of cause in fact from the policy issues of proxi-
mate causation, and dumps the dual problem of causation into the lap of
the jury, then obviously all roads will not lead to Rome. A failure to see
this balancing of interests denominator as one principle of tort liability
rather than two sometimes leads. to the curious case of the twice-blessed
defendant. This is the fortunate defendant who has his responsibilities
first weighed on the scale of duty and then reweighed in the balance of
proximate cause. 5
It is under this duty denominator that the one percent contributorily
negligent plaintiff can best be analyzed; that the defenses of consent
and assumption of risk can best be evaluated; that the dilemma of govern-
mental immunity, whether it destroys that right or the remedy, can be
faced;8 6 that damnum as differentiated from injuria is to be recognized
or denied. As the cause in fact was preeminently the province of the
practitioner and the jury, the denominator of duty is used by the judge to
shape the everchanging outlines of the Tort Cause of Action. Appropriate
here are the words of Dean Prosser as he criticizes the term duty.
When we find a duty, breach and damage, everything has been said. The
word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be
imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of events;
beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether or not there is a duty,
many factors interplay: the hand of history, our idea of morals and justice,
the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to
where the loss should fall.6 7
As an element in the negligence cause of action, the word duty has
always been familiar to the legal professionals. Heretofore, little specific
65 Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955), 41 Cornell L.Q. 329 (1955).
The notewriter, after trying to decide whether the Court of Appeals had determined on
non-liability of the state for damages on the basis of duty or proximate cause when a
convict escaped from a negligently maintained minimum security prison and frightened to
death a person whom he forced to aid him in the attempted escape, acknowledges with
admirable restraint that "There is some uncertainty as to which one of the two formed
the basis for the Court of Appeals' decision .... " 41 Cornell L.Q. at 330.
66 See the opinions of Justices Field and Nelsen writing respectively for the majority and
the minority in The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
67 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 16.
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use of the term has been made in the other "torts." Occasionally, it
crops out-a nuisance case, 68 a statute of frauds situation,69 an action for
trover and conversion 70 a novel damage theory.71 Nevertheless, the con-
siderations that determine it are present throughout the field of tort
liability. It is a common denominator that can be identified and em-
ployed. The same considerations of conflicting interests that determine
the extension of liability of manufacturers of chattels for negligently
caused injuries to those not in privity are present in atomic radiation
cases, group libel situations, human dignity affronts, false imprisonment
and deceit cases. The difference lies only in the degree of recognition
between old and long-familiar faces, and those just now seeking our
acquaintance. "New occasions teach new duties." 72
Violation
Whereas, under damages the injury to the plaintiff's interest was con-
sidered, this factor finds its common thread in the conduct of the defend-
ant. In each of the so-called "torts," when damages to the plaintiff have
been admitted, when the cause in fact of these damages has been ob-
viously the act of the defendant, when the policy considerations of poten-
tial liability have been determined, the question still remains for solu-
tion: "Did the defendant conduct himself in a proscribed manner?"
Remember that in the Tort Cause of Action I am considering, not the
sides of a box, not clear-cut lines of division, but general principles
underlying tort liability which tend to interpenetrate in places. This
difficulty was apparent in my discussion of damages. Within that de-
nominator was grouped the facts determining injuries, not damnum.
Similarly, under cause, it was the cause in fact rather than the considera-
tion of proximate cause that was identified. So here, in dealing with the
problem of violation of duty, it is the "factness" of the violation rather
than the "oughtness" that is considered as a denominator of tort liability.
The "oughtness" of damnum, of legal causation, of justifiable conduct are
all proper considerations denominated as duty. Thus, while the "ought-
ness" and "factness" of the violation may in many instances be difficult
68 Ware v. Cincinnati, 93 Ohio App. 431, 111 N.E.2d 401 (1952).
69 In re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. Utah 1953).
70 May v. City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 258 P.2d 945 (Okla. 1953).
71 Swan v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston*, 225 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1955)
(Action against a church and its board of directors and publishing society to recover damages
for defendant's refusal to reinstate plaintiff's name on defendants' published list of the
church's religious healing practitioners, as requested by him after his withdrawal of name
therefrom).
72 From an old Welsh tune "Once to Every Man" with words by James Russell Lowell.
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to consider separately, each separate tort requires a factual answer to the
question earlier posed: "Did the defendant conduct himself in a pro-
scribed manner?". The defendant, while driving his automobile, ran into
and injured the plaintiff, breaking his arm. At the time the plaintiff was
walking across the street at an intersection. There is no question as to
the existence of damages, only how much. Cause in fact is clear. The
standard duty of care was long since formulated by Judge Brett in
Heaven v. Pender73 as:
The proposition which these recognized cases suggest, and which is,
therefore, to be deduced from them, is that whenever one person is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every-
one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he
did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or prop-
erty of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid
such danger.
The defendant swears he was crawling at a snail's pace, that the light
was green for him and red for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff dashed out
from between two parked cars, and practically climbed up the radiator
of his car. Not so at all, the plaintiff claims. The defendant was racing
forty miles an hour in a 10 mile an hour zone, trying to beat the light that
had already changed. He deliberately drove into plaintiff who was in the
middle of the street, on the crosswalk.
Did the defendant violate the duty of due care? Was the plaintiff
contributorily negligent as a matter of fact? Did the defendant, in fact,
intentionally strike the plaintiff, and thus subject himself to liability for
a battery, hence not dischargeable in bankruptcy? Was the automobile
in fact an experimental jet-propelled type that, without any intent on
the part of the defendant, went out of control? The fact of conduct, the
fact of the state of mind, the fact of the ultra-hazardous instrumentality
are to be determined throughout the field of tort liability whether it be
by a jury, a judge without a jury, or an administrative agency. 4 The
defendant in fact did the particular damage. Damages alone are not yet
a sufficient basis of recovery. Damages brought about by certain patterns
of activity thrust civil liability; patterns still to be discovered will extend
or change the thrust liability. In each instance, a common denominator
is present-did the conduct of the defendant violate the particular
pattern? Here, for instance, the question is not, should fault be the test
of defendant's conduct. That determination can best be taken up under
73 [1883] 11 Q.B. 503, 509 (C.A.).
74 For an excellent development of the details of proof see Morris, "Proof of Negligence,"
47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 817 (1953).
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the denominator of duty. Under violation the question more properly is,
assuming the test is fault, did the defendant's conduct in fact violate the
standards of fault.
IV. SOME ADVANTAGES OF THE SYNTHESIS
Part II of this article presented some of the difficulties faced by the
legal professionals and the public under a system of tort liability based
on specified categories of wrongdoing. The Tort Cause of Action, as
explained in Part III, is not meant to be a competing system to "torts."
It is not a choice between "torts" or the Tort Cause of Action. It is not
Pollock or Salmond. The Tort Cause of Action is merely a synthesis
of basic factors which apparently shape the determination of tort liability.
It describes a method for analyzing tort liability. Its purpose is not
revolutionary but evolutionary. The methodology of the Tort Cause of
Action is not to attack "torts" where it works, but where it doesn't
work. If the synthesis be accepted as a tool rather than a goal; I suggest
that the Tort Cause of Action can be very useful in overcoming some
of the difficulties inherent in "torts."
The more recent developments in the area of tort liability present many
instances of judicial and legislative thinking along the lines of unitary
principles. The so-called "prima facie" tort is an example of this type
of thinking. Mr. Justice Holmes put it this way:
It has been considered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of
temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive
law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the
defendant is to escape.75
This thesis presents certain underlying factors shaping liability in a
particular section of the tort field. The factors thus described are:
(1) damages
(2) intent
(3) justification.
Absent any traditional compartment within which the injury complained
of might fit, the prima facie tort has developed as a comprehensive
method of analyzing intentional conduct. It seems unfortunate that in
New York, where this methodology has had its greatest development,
the present tendency of the courts seems to consider this as merely
another rather specifically limited tort rather than as a tool to aid in
75 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904), referred to with approval in Advance
Music Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946). For an excellent
note on the subject, see "The Prima Fade Tort Doctrine," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1952).
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the analysis of unusual "intentional conduct" cases.76 If the doctrine of
the prima facie tort is properly a synthesis of the basic factors underlying
tort liability in the intentional conduct cases, the synthesis of the Tort
Cause of Action is logically the next step.
Along with intentional conduct, liability for negligent conduct is in the
process of being pressured and shaped by evolutionary devices. Courts
are prone to say that negligence is never presumed, it must be alleged
and proved. By definition, fault is essential to liability based on negli-
gent conduct. Yet peculiar cases keep coming up in today's specialized
society wherein the lawyer for the plaintiff cannot prove orthodox fault.
Historically, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was a tool to use when the
facts of the case made it clear that the conduct of the defendant was the
actual cause of the plaintiff's injury, but the details of that conduct, for
the purpose of determining the element of violation or negligence, were
unavailable to plaintiff. 77 What is to be done for Mr. Ybarra, who
entered the hospital for an appendectomy and came out unable to lift
or rotate his arm? Somewhere, somehow, along the chain of four doctors
and two nurses, someone acted negligently. But who? A verdict against
all of them was affirmed by a California court, using res ipsa as the tool.
7 8
Inherent in the decisions is the thesis, not that fault is being abandoned,
but that the more orthodox devices of inferences or presumptions have to
yield their rigidity of form to the substance of the facts. Thus the tool
of res ipsa loquitur, in California at least, seems to -be evolving into a
limited method of attacking some of the technical difficulties inherent in
the tort of negligence.
The difficulties posed by statutes limiting the time for the commence-
ment of actions based on the various "torts" has been referred to pre-
viously.79 In seeking solutions to this problem the courts have developed
a process of analysis known as the "gravamen" theory." Simply stated,
it is a matter of substance over form, of disregarding the label of the
76 Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214 (1953); Brand v. Winchell, 283 App.
Div. 338, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't 1954); cf., Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, 207
Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955), 41 Cornell L.Q. 507 (1956). In
the Rager case, the Court of Appeals deliberately expressed its views upon the subject of the
damages requirement.
77 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722 (Ex. 1863); Benedict v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 40 At.
1067 (1898).
78 Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal. App. 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949). Previously, the California
Supreme Court had reversed a judgment of non-suit. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
This decision is criticized by Seavey, "Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio," 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 643 (1950). For a defense of it see Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," 37
Calif. L. Rev. 183, 223 (1949).
79 See supra p. 39.
80 1 C.J.S., "Actions," § 46.
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complaint in favor of the material part of the allegation. In this way the
courts, using factors basic to liability and without the specific help of
legislation, have been able to overcome the artificial limitation of com-
partmentalized "torts."'
Legislators, by establishing definitions on a broader basis than specific
categories of wrongdoing, help solve these difficulties. The New York
General Construction Law, section 37(a), defines personal injury as
follows: " 'Personal injury' includes libel, slander and malicious prosecu-
tion; also an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable
injury to the person either of the plaintiff, or of another." In describing
the procedure for presenting a claim against the governing body of any
school district, the New York Education Law uses the broadest language:
2. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary hereinbefore contained in
this section, no action or special proceeding founded upon tort shall be
prosecuted ... against any teacher . . . unless a notice of claim .... 2
Note the title of the general enabling legislation authorizing certain claims
against the federal government, "The Federal Tort Claims Act." Section
130 of the New York Decedent Estate Law speaks of an action to recover
damages "for a wrongful act, neglect or default .... "
Here and there, efforts are being made to solve some of the difficulties
inherent in a plural torts system by analytical methods based on observed
unitary principles. The only difference between the methods presently
being employed and the Tort Cause of Action is one of degree. Denomi-
nators common to specific sections or groups have heretofore been sought.
The methodology of the Tort Cause of Action takes the next and obvious
step of identifying denominators common to the entire area of tort lia-
bility, and utilizing these common factors of Damages, Cause, Duty, and
Violation to seek solutions to problems not easily solved by a plural
concept.
Describing "torts" in terms of the Tort Cause of Action offers many
pedagogical advantages. Fortunately for the teacher in this field, the law
of "torts" is more than adequately documented. There is a rich abun-
dance of texts, studies, and restatements. Unlike so many other fields,
where the teacher has to utilize a rather large proportion of his class time
just teaching what the routine law is, in the field of tort liability that
81 The present position of the New York Court of Appeals as to the gravamen theory
is, to say the least, unclear. See note 32 supra. The gravamen theory appeared well
established in Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938), but the
subsequent decisions in Blessington v. McCrory Stores -Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421
(1953) and Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955) cast doubt on the
present status of the gravamen theory.
82 N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813, subd. 2, effective July 1, 1953.
[Vol. 42
TORT CAUSE OF ACTION
job has been done by recognized masters and presumably the students
will read the suggested text. The classroom teacher can more properly
apply himself to the questions raised by the routine situations covered
in the students' reading and to the development of a background against
which his students can learn to fit the pieces of that which today is the
unusual, tomorrow the routine. This is not "ivory tower" stuff. It is the
heart and soul of legal education. Of course, the "is-ness" of the law must
be taught. But that includes not only what the law was when the pro-
fessor went to law school, but also what it is right now, and what it may
well be ten years from now when our quondam student is urging a position
in the highest court of his jurisdiction. It is in this area of analysis that
teaching tools are scarce. The numerous tort casebooks, as differentiated
from texts, excellent as they all are, spend so much coverage on the rou-
tine and established "is-ness," devote so many cases to the teaching of the
law, that out of the 73 periods in a five-hour course very little time is left
for the process that directs its focus primarily on the student rather than
on the professor-the learning process, the creative process. A classroom
presentation of "torts" cases in assault and battery, trover and conver-
sion, negligence, strict liability, misrepresentation, defamation, inter-
ferences with contracts, etc., grouped not thusly, but analyzed primarily
as problems involving damages, cause, duty, and violation serves the dual
purpose of helping the students discover both the law and the facts. As
to the law, he can be stimulated both to verify the law as it is and to
assist in its development. As to the facts, he can learn the process of find-
ing, investigating, and establishing them.8 3 In this way he becomes sensi-
tive to the problems of the practitioner and the jurist.
While the dividing line between law and fact is often vague and
indistinguishable, as was pointed out in Part III of this article, there are
great areas of fact-finding and law-giving. A methodology of tort analysis
recognizing this major division should be of assistance to the practitioner
and the jurist. The developments in adjective law have proceeded far in
advance of substantive law in this regard. Over one hundred years ago,
the New York Legislature appointed a commission "to revise, reform,
simplify, and abridge" the practice and pleading before courts of record
in New York, instructing the commissioners "to provide for the aboli-
tion of the present forms of actions and pleadings in cases at common
law; for a uniform course of proceeding in all cases whether of legal or
83 Those interested in tort pedagogy may well ask: "where are such ,teaching tools?" The
author hopes to be able to provide an answer in the not too distant future. There is pres-
ently available an excellent article by L. Green, "The Study and Teaching of Tort Law," 33
Texas L. Rev. 1 (1955).
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equitable cognizance, and for the abandonment of all Latin and other
foreign tongues, so far as the same shall by them be deemed practicable,
and of any form and proceeding not necessary to ascertain or preserve
the rights of the parties. 84 The procedural reform brought about by the
"Field Code" in New York in 1848 was continued in 1938 by the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In spite of the criticism
often urged that this departure from the precision of common-law plead-
ing makes for slipshod practice and poor law, only a few jurisdictions
still maintain a writ system based on forms of action. 5 The Tort Cause
of Action simply attempts to apply the same principles of reform and
development to the substantive law of tort liability. The primary function
of the practitioner as a fact-finder and fact-pleader is recognized. The
primary responsibility of the jurist for the determination of the law is
acknowledged. The tools with which the lawyer primarily attacks the
tort problems are the facts involved in damages, actual cause, and viola-
tion. Duty is the workshop of the judge. While there will be, of course,
a constant overlap, many of the difficulties faced by the practitioner and
the judge under a plural "torts" concept disappear when the responsibility
of each is brought into a proper perspective.
Mrs. Kathryn V. Bartow was seven months pregnant. She and her
husband had recently sold their farm to Mr. R. D. Smith, and some
wrangling grew out of the sale. On a Saturday afternoon in Norwalk,
Ohio, while Mrs. Bartow was walking with her mother, Mr. Smith stepped
up to her, and in the presence of people that were walking to and fro,
in a loud voice and with a flushed face, it is alleged he repeatedly called
Mrs. Bartow a "God damned son of a bitch" and "a dirty crook." Dis-
traught and embarrassed, with passers-by stopping to stare, Mrs.
Bartow's mother took her quickly by the arm and rushed her into a
nearby store. Mr. Smith's voice followed her into the store. For weeks
Mrs. Bartow could not stop sobbing. Medical attention was required
because of her nervousness. Fortunately, she went through her child-
birth without any adversity. Mrs. Bartow instituted an action for
damages in the Court of Common Pleas of Huron County, Ohio, against
Mr. R. D. Smith. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss on the opening statement of counsel for plaintiff and the allega-
tions of the petition as summarized above. The Court of Appeals reversed
the Court of Common Pleas and held that the plaintiff, on the petition and
opening statement, was entitled to submit her evidence to the jury. The
Supreme Court of Ohio, splitting four to three, reversed the judgment of
84 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1847, c. 59, § 8. See Clark, Code Pleading (2d ed. 1947).
8-5 Clark, op. cit. supra at 23-54.
[Vol. 42
TORT CAUSE OF ACTION
the Court of Appeals and affirmed that of the Court of Common Pleas. 6
To the majority of the Supreme Court, the positive law of Ohio had no
traditional compartment fitting the facts alleged. The powerful dissent
of Judge Hart sought to shape the positive law to the living law of the
laymen, accountably disturbed by the technicalities of "torts" and who
seek, not a perpetuation of the mistakes of the past, but an adjustment
to the problems of the present and the future.
V. BE:oN, ToRT LmBILITY
If the Tort Cause of Action successfully identifies and synthesizes the
basic factors of duty, violation, cause and damages in the area of tort
liability, are they unique to that area? I advance the proposition that
those denominators of tort liability are simply aspects of the same broad
determinatives of legal liability.
Certainly, compartmentalized thinking is not unique with "torts."
Robert S. Stevens, former dean of the Cornell Law School and Professor
of Law Emeritus there, sharply brings into focus the problem of catego-
ries as he writes a plea for the continuation in the law school curriculum
of a course in Equity.
A course in Equity can have an incidental pedagogical value. There
has long been a degree of criticism that law is taught by courses which
have been given subject-matter titles like Torts, Contracts, Property,
Criminal Law, Procedure, etc., and that students are apt to regard these as
actual divisions of the law rather than segments set apart artificially for
convenience in teaching. Equity has no comparable subject matter; it is a
way of thinking, a method of trying to administer justice. It has invaded
and supplied adjuncts to all the topical fields of law. And, therefore, when
the student studies the appeals to equity against the commission of a per-
sonal tort, against the breach of a contract, for the protection of property
interests, against the commission of a crime, or against a criminal prosecu-
tion, this tends to break the barrier of the artificial compartmentalization.8 7
The field of Quasi-Contracts is an early attempt to bridge the artificial
gap between torts and contracts. Unfortunately, it too has become
stylized into a third compartment."8 Thomas Cowan thinks contracts and
torts should be merged into a course entitled Obligations. 9 He raises
the delightful query, would a course in Obligations be a box or a bag?
Curriculum committees are constantly at work breaking down the old
86 Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948).
87 Stevens, "Brief on Behalf of a Course in Equity," 8 3. Legal Ed. 422, 425 (1956). A
companion article, "A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles and Remedies," appears
in 41 Cornell L.Q. 351 (1956).
88 Corbin, "Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit," 19 Yale L.J. 221 (1910); Hume,
"Unjust Enrichment: The Applicable Statute of Limitations," 35 Cornell L.Q. 797 (1950).
89 Cowan, "Contracts and Torts Should be Merged," 7 3. Legal Ed. 377 (1955).
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course divisions and rebuilding broader areas of integrated materials.
Perhaps the most comprehensive attack on this problem of teaching
within a legal system is presently being carried out at the Yale Law
School, as the result of a generous gift from the Ford Foundation.
Within the common-law system, the subject matter compartments are
being broken down by expanding concepts basic to the determination of
legal liability.
F. S. C. Northrup believes that if enduring peace is to be established,
the rule of law must be extended to the whole world." He finds an inter-
national law conceived by one culture and thrust upon another not only
ineffective but hazardous. His solution is to seek out and identify those
denominators common in each world cultural group. Once identified, they
can be synthesized into a pluralism of the world's living law.
A Ford Foundation grant to the Cornell Law School will permit Ameri-
can and foreign scholars to explore common legal problems.91 Rather
than seeking out the living law of a nation or cultural group by so-
ciological methods, a program of seminars, attended by such foreign and
American scholars, is being planned as a part of the program. Certain
specific factors affecting legal liability in this country (for which in the
tort field contributory negligence might be used as an example) will be
analyzed by the experts in an attempt to discover what effect is given to
these determinative factors in other nations and systems.
It is a mighty long jump from "attractive nuisance" to a world order
and I suppose only a professor would attempt it. Yet, if common to the
"torts" of trover and violation of the right of privacy, are factors of
damages legally caused by violation of imposed duties, perhaps it is not
too far-fetched to suppose that in a relational definition of law 2 these
determinators transcend the subject matter of tort liability.
90 Northrup, The Taming of the Nations (1952).
9' 135 N.Y.LJ. 1, Apr. 20, 1956 page 1. See also 41 Cornell L.Q. 437 (1956).
92 The author's frame of reference is outlined in Ward, "Meditations," 7 J. Legal Ed. 376
(1955).
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